TIME TO TAKE ACTION The 2006/07 crime statistics
With increases of 2.4% and 4.6% respectively in the murder and aggravated robbery rates, the police's release of the 2006/07 crime statistics confirmed the fears of many that violent crime is on the increase.
During the media conference the police communicated the bad news badly in an obvious attempt to downplay the seriousness of a situation over which they, according to their own admission, actually have very little control. In a bizarre way this confirms that whatever we are doing to fight crime isn't working and that it is time to consider something completely different.
W
hen the South African Police Service (SAPS) released the latest crime statistics, they confirmed what many people expected -that there had been a serious increase in violent crime. This upward trend was disappointing, particularly in view of promising decreases since 2002/03. The news led to renewed calls in the media for the Minister of Safety and Security and the National Commissioner of the SAPS to be 'fired ' (e.g.in The Citizen 2007:12) . The statistics also gave ammunition to those who doubt South Africa's ability to provide adequate levels of security during the 2010 Soccer World Cup. But, above all, the statistics had a negative impact on public perceptions of crime and, according to a recent Markinor survey, the police's ability to protect civilians and their property (Harris & Radealli 2007) .
The analysis in this article focuses primarily on murder and aggravated robbery and draws on international experience to contextualise the trends revealed in the SAPS statistics.
The overall crime picture
In South Africa crime and crime statistics remain highly controversial and contested issues. No explanation will ever satisfy everyone. In a country with undeniably high levels of crime, strong public reaction is understandable and more so after a particularly bad year such as 2006/07. Even the 'good' news, that there is an overall downward trend, was met with scepticism and suspicion. This is also not a uniquely South African phenomenon. In the 2005/06 British Crime Survey (BCS), for example, it was found that:
[d]espite the total number of crimes estimated by the BCS falling over recent years, comparatively high proportions of people continue to believe that crime has risen across the country as a whole and in their local area. reported to the police. Yet, ironically, in 2003 South Africa hosted an incident-free ICC Cricket World Cup, 2 which shows that crime on its own is not a fair criterion to judge the police's ability to provide adequate security for a major event such as the 2010 Soccer World Cup. In 2002/03 a total of 2 629 137 crimes (in the category of most serious crimes) were reported to the police, compared to 2 125 227 in 2006/07. That is a decrease of almost 20%. The graph in Figure 1 shows that the overall crime rate dropped steadily by approximately 6% per year between 2002/03 and 2005/06, but in 2006/07 the decrease slowed to only 2%.
Judging from the overall picture, at least as far as reported crime is concerned, crime is still on the decrease, albeit at a slower rate than in the three preceding years. This raises legitimate questions about why the rate of decrease has slowed. Indeed, although the crime statistics provided by the SAPS are generally regarded as fairly accurate and credible, the question of the extent to which reported crime is a true reflection of the 'real' crime situation remains relevant. For example, according to Burton et al (2004:105-108 But it is undoubtedly the violence associated with crime in South Africa that has had the most negative impact on perceptions of crime and the vulnerability expressed by many. Accordingly, the following six violent crimes and crime tendencies (i.e. murder and five types of aggravated robbery: house robbery, business robbery, bank robbery, cash-in-transit robbery and car-hijackings) will be briefly discussed.
Violent crime trends
Murder and aggravated robbery are the two violent crimes that, after consecutive years in which the statistics revealed a steady decrease in the rate of incidence, again showed an upward curve in the 2006/07 period. According to the police (SAPS 2007:11) much of the increase in robbery in particular can be linked to the security guard strike of April -June 2006 '… which left a void for robbers … to commit crime'. In turn, aggravated robbery would also have an impact on the murder rate, because murder and attempted murder often accompany these robberies.
Murder
In the eleven-year period between 1994/95 and 2005/06, the murder rate decreased by approximately 41% from 67 per 100 000 to 39.5 ( Figure 3 ). Twice before, in 1995/06 and 1998/99, public with the security they believe they are entitled to. For example, in their 2006/07 crime report the SAPS indicated that a docket analysis showed that in 81,5% of murder cases the perpetrators were known to their victims; in 61,9% of cases perpetrators were either relatives, friends or acquaintances of victims; and in 20,1% of cases perpetrators were relatives (SAPS 2007:28) . According to the police, the relatively high number of contact crimes occur in social environments (e.g. residences), which are normally outside the reach of conventional policing (SAPS 2007:4 SA CRIME QUARTERLY No 21 • SEPTEMBER 2007 3 BURGER the murder rate showed slight increases followed again by consecutive years of decline. In 2006/07 the rate increased once again to 40.5. It is impossible to say whether this is just another periodical increase to be followed by a renewed downward trend or whether this is indicative of a new rise in violent crime in this country.
Claims by the police that most murders and other 'social contact crimes' take place between people who know each other is often met with disbelief and regarded as an excuse for not providing the 100 000) decreased to 272.2 and 255.3 respectively. Although the rate was still much higher than the 1996/97 figure, these decreases were promising and raised expectations that aggravated robbery was on the decline. However, in 2006/07 the rate of aggravated robberies increased again (with 4,6%) to 267.1 per 100 000 or, in real terms, 126 558 incidents.
The real threat or perceived threat of aggravated robbery is better understood when it is disaggregated into some of its sub-categories. and 10% of female victims were likely to be killed by a friend or an acquaintance; 59% of female and 9% of male victims were likely to be killed by an intimate partner; 17% and 18% of male and female victims respectively were likely to be killed by a family member; and only 2% of female victims are killed by an unknown person, compared to 25% of male victims. This analysis supports the argument that the ability of the police to impact on 'social contact crimes' such as murder is more limited than the public generally realises. The only real proactive contribution the police can make in this regard is by creating a credible deterrent through effective and efficient investigations (the creation of a belief or certainty in the minds of potential criminals that they will be caught).
Aggravated robbery
Apart from murder and rape, aggravated robbery, certainly because of its nature and the violence or threat of violence associated with it, currently seems to be the most feared crime in this country. As shown in Figure 4, The reason why criminals in many cases shoot and kill their victims even after they completed the initial crime (e.g. robbery), remains a contentious and unresolved phenomenon. However, it is informative to know that this phenomenon has also been observed elsewhere. In a report by the Police Executive Research Forum (2006:6-7) it was found, based on the crime figures for the United States, that not only was robbery becoming more prevalent, but also more deadly. As one of the police chiefs observed: … a disturbing aspect in a number of robberies was that upon completion of the robbery the victim was shot anyway.
Conclusion
The main message from these figures is clear: whatever we as a country (not just the police) are doing to fight crime, is not working. It shows us that there is something seriously wrong with our approach to this 'fight' and the way in which we present our crime situation. The release of this year's statistics was again overshadowed by explanations of why our crime is not as bad as it appears to be. In an apparent attempt to underplay the gravity of the situation, the release was accompanied by remarks such as: 'It's not a train smash ' and, in To enable a more fair and sensible distribution of responsibility for crime fighting, we need an integrated national strategy. Such a strategy should direct all available government resources on a massive scale to achieving realistic objectives. An integrated national strategy of this kind will only be possible if it is preceded by a comprehensive national inquiry, e.g. by a commission of inquiry, to determine the extent of our crime, where it happens, why it happens, and why it is so violent. The commission (or its alternative) should also be mandated to determine what needs to be done, and by whom. The allocation of tasks will have to be realistic; both as far as the tasking of the right people (government departments and other role players) and the setting of achievable targets are concerned. Such a massive and all-out national campaign to fight crime is not only a precondition for success, but will only work if it is controlled by an overarching national coordinating structure with the overriding authority to direct all government departments, and not just the criminal justice system. The National Security Council (NSC) may be just such a structure, but changes to its mandate, structure and functioning would be required. … while several of my ministerial colleagues and Tory MP's supported the police in public, they were highly critical of them in private. There was impatience, if not anger, that although we had spent 87% more in real terms since 1979, and had increased police numbers by 27 000, there had still been a substantial increase in crime.
In the last six years the SAPS numbers increased with approximately 40 000 and their budget almost doubled from R17 billion to R32 billion. This gives us a police/public ratio of approximately 1:370, which is already better than the UN guideline of 1:400. This situation is set to improve even further with more than 30 000 police officials to be added over the next three years to reach a target of 192 000 by 2010. We are, therefore, entitled to expect the police and the rest of the criminal justice system to be more effective and efficient in terms of what they are, or should be, capable of. We know from international research that the police do not prevent crime; at best they can act as a deterrent to crime in places where they (the police) are present.
This means our police need to become more visible. A visible police presence goes a long way to reassuring a fearful public. Police investigations should also be motivated by the desire to engender a realistic fear in the minds of criminals or wouldbe criminals that they will be caught. For optimal deterrence, good investigations should be followed by well-prepared prosecutions, and a prison system that can accommodate those who receive prison sentences (and keep them there). Considering its prevailing weaknesses it is clear that our criminal justice system is currently not able to meet all of these challenges.
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In this regard, and to the extent that the police can reduce crime, the crime statistics do raise pertinent questions, for example:
• What was (is) the impact of the ongoing restructuring process on the police's ability to combat crime? • There are renewed calls for more community involvement in the fight against crime, but why is it taking the police such a long time (since 1998) to finalise (approve) its policy/national instruction on sector policing -a practical policing concept that was developed specifically to enhance police-community cooperation? • How can the police set themselves a target of decreasing contact crimes by 7-10% per year when they argue, convincingly, that they do not control the socio-economic causes and conditions that underlie crime? Ithanga, the site of my research project, is one of these outlying villages. It is about 30km from the centre of Lusikisiki. Its population of 600-700 people have no electricity and no running water. Until about a generation ago, the primary source of employment for the village was the Witwatersrand's gold mining industry. As is well known, the industry's labour force contracted rapidly and permanently in the late 1980s. Today, the village's primary source of income consists of state pensions, survivalist self-employment and short-term wage labour.
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Ithangans would not have heard of ART before MSF's Lusikisiki project. And, as an outlying village, they would have heard about it later than most of Lusikisiki's people. The nearest clinic is some 15km away. The majority of Ithangans would have first heard about ART in the form of rumours and news from villages closer to the centre of town.
The ART programme
Before examining the response of Ithangans to the arrival of ART, I will first describe the programme itself. It constituted a bold innovation in AIDS medicine, inasmuch as it aimed to deliver ART through primary healthcare clinics rather than hospitals, and was to be administered by nurses and lay people rather than doctors. Indeed, MSF is an outspoken advocate of the idea that South Africa will only achieve universal access to ART if treatment is primarily clinic-based, and nurseinitiated. Their argument is twofold. First, the extent of the epidemic is so great that if treatment is confined to hospitals, programmes will soon bottleneck and the majority of those in need of treatment will die waiting. Secondly, if people are to adhere to treatment, ART must be as decentralised as possible. At hospitals, patients arrive from distant districts and disappear again; medical personnel can only hope that they will return for their next batch of pills. If treatment is clinic-based, each patient is known to the clinic's lay personnel, and the direct relationship between patient and healthcare provider encourages adherence to treatment, timely reporting of illness, and so forth.
When MSF arrived in Lusikisiki in 2003 the district's 12 primary healthcare clinics were hardly in a state to tackle a great epidemic. Only two had reliable electricity supply, and just one had running water or a phone. Fewer than four in ten nursing posts were filled. Per capita, the district had 14 times more people per doctor than the national average. The majority of clinic nurses encountered by MSF project leader, Hermann Reuter, during his first weeks and months in Lusikisiki, did not believe that there was an AIDS epidemic.
Four years later, these same clinics had conducted 46 000 HIV tests and put 2 200 people on ARVs (MSF 2006) . The key to the transformation of these once moribund institutions lay in the recruitment of a cohort of lay people to alleviate the workload of nurses. Adherence counsellors staff each of the 12 clinics: they are trained to perform voluntary counselling and testing, prepare patients for treatment, establish support groups for antiretroviral users, monitor adherence, and collect data. Pharmacy assistants are recruited to dispense medicines, monitor low stocks, and place persistent pressure upstream to supply the district's burgeoning need for medicines. Anti-retroviral users themselves play a significant role, tracing defaulters, recruiting others to test, and giving treatment a public face.
The programme is by no means without serious problems, the most grave of which is personnel shortages. I return to this question at the end of this paper.
AIDS in Ithanga before treatment
My primary informant in Ithanga was a 29-year-old man whom I shall call Sizwe Magadla. I met Sizwe in October 2005. He told me then that he knew of six people in Ithanga who had died of AIDS, all in the last four years. I asked a dozen or so other villagers how many Ithangans had died of AIDS. Some said five, others seven. The majority said six.
It is almost certain, though, that the figure was considerably higher than that, for villagers' standard definition of AIDS before the advent of ART was very narrow indeed. A person was said to have died of AIDS if she contracted chronic diarrhoea that did not respond to treatment, grew very thin, and died. Yet that is hardly the most common chain of events leading to an AIDS death. Those who displayed other symptoms were generally said not to have died of AIDS. A person who contracted cryptococcal meningitis, for instance, or AIDS dementia, was said to have had a demon sent to him by an enemy. A person suffering from shingles -a common opportunistic infection triggered by immunodeficiency -was said to have had a witch's snake crawl over her skin while she slept.
It was common cause among informants that those who were known to have died of AIDS were thought to have died shameful deaths. The four most common answers to why AIDS deaths were shameful were these: 1) People say X got AIDS because she (or he) slept around. 2) People say X brought AIDS home and has probably given it to her husband (or his wife). 3) People say that because X cannot control her (or his) sexual appetite, she is killing the people close to her. 4) People say X knew she had AIDS and slept around to take as many people as she could with her to the grave.
In other words, the accusation is that X has been sexually gluttonous, and as a result, has endangered the lives of, or perhaps even murdered, her loved ones.
Testing day
ART arrived in Ithanga abruptly on a Saturday morning in February 2005. A group of nurses and lay counsellors set up a mobile centre at the local school to offer voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) for a day. In the preceding weeks, lay counsellors had met with the local chief to obtain his permission to perform VCT in the village, and had then gone door to door to inform residents of their plans. By Saturday morning, most Ithanga residents knew that they were coming.
During the course of testing day, some 200 hundred Ithangans drifted to and from the school. Most had not come to test, but to watch. Their curiosity was profoundly ungenerous. They had come to see who
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was HIV-positive. It was, they believed, not hard to tell. As Sizwe explains it: 'To know, you just had to stand and observe. You looked for how long the people stay. You see, there is counselling before the test, and counselling after the test. The counselling before the test, it's the same for everybody: a few minutes. But the counselling after the test: for some it lasts two minutes, for others, it is a long, long, time.
By the time the day ended, the whole village knew who had tested HIV-positive.'
MSF personnel were of course acutely aware that the testing process was hardly private. They did not want AIDS to be hidden, primarily for two reasons. First, they wanted communities to see for themselves how extensive the epidemic was, and thus to banish denial. Second, MSF believed that this fish-bowl approach to testing was the best way to combat stigma. Their message to those who walked into their testing centres was this: yes, there is ill feeling out there, but it doesn't matter. Yes, your community will know your status, but you will be okay. Once you realise that the hostility will not hurt you, you will have walked through an invisible barrier. You will have shaken off an unspeakable burden and an intolerable pain. Come with us, there are many of us, we have support groups, we have formed networks of HIV-positive people, and you will be safe and will find meaning in those networks.
On that Saturday morning in February 2005 about forty people went to the school to test for HIV, the majority of them young women. By the end of the day, nine women had been identified as having tested HIV-positive.
As news circulated, Ithanga went into a state of collective shock. In the course of a few hours, nine healthy, ordinary-looking villagers, most of them young women, had been marked with death. Ithanga had just had its first taste of what it means to live in the midst of a disease that banks itself invisibly in the bodies of the young and the healthy.
Such information is not easily absorbed. In the weeks and months that followed, those who had tested positive were watched. Nobody told them that they were being watched. Nobody said to their faces that their status was common knowledge. But everything about them was observed in meticulous detail: whether they coughed, or lost weight, or stayed at home ill; whether they boarded a taxi, and if so, whether that taxi was going to the clinic; above all, with whom they slept. These observations were not generous; they issued from a gallery of silent jeerers.
In essence, Ithangans were using their knowledge of the nine villagers' HIV status to fuel their sense of denial. By putting an invisible fence around the nine women and silently jeering at them, the village was in effect putting a fence around AIDS.
After testing day
Such was the immediate aftermath of testing day, but what were some of the more long-term effects?
I discerned two, and was interested to note that they appeared at first sight to sit uncomfortably together. The first is that ordinary villagers' definition of AIDS expanded considerably. As Sizwe explained it: 'We started noticing things we had not noticed before. For example, the people who were saying that the marks on their skin were the work of ichanti went to the inyangas to be treated against witchcraft and many got sicker and died. The people with the marks on their skin who went to the clinic were told they had AIDS. They were given the drugs for their skin and they got better.'
Similarly, villagers began noticing that people displaying the symptoms of neurological disorders, long associated with witchcraft, were diagnosed as having AIDS dementia and cryptococal meningitis and were treated with drugs. Thus, in the wake of testing day, villagers' definitions of AIDS expanded dramatically; people saw much more of AIDS around them than they had in the past.
And yet, the fact that lay definitions of AIDS broadened, and the fact that this broadening was closely associated with the diagnostic and palliative competence of allopathic medicine, did not translate smoothly or simply into an endorsement of the efficacy of antiretroviral drugs. One's attitude to treatment is determined as much by what one feels as what one sees. And what one feels is shaped in large part by whether the pills themselves are associated with shame or with pride, with resignation or with confidence, with danger or with hope. And these things are all determined in no small part by the sort of face the healthcare system presents when it comes to test, by whether the clinics are clean, efficient, and user-friendly, and their staff competent, by whether one feels safe and cared for there, and by the sorts of communities ARV-users form.
In my experience of Ithanga, a minority of those who started treatment associated the pills unambiguously with life. They celebrated and were thankful for the pills. They exuded no shame. Generally, they had a warm relationship with the nurse or adherence counsellor or community health worker who guided them on to treatment, and they associated treatment with that person. Yet many other people associated the pills with the danger of being exposed and shamed. Nobody wanted what had happened to those nine young women in February 2005: nobody wanted to test positive before the eyes of their community.
My last field trip to Ithanga was in April 2007, more than two years after treatment came to the village. The 16 or so people I knew to be chronically sick and whom I interviewed could be divided into three categories. The first were openly on ARVs, had embraced them as a life force, and were largely unhurt by the silent and ungenerous thoughts and whispers of fellow villagers. A second category would not go to the clinics to have their CD4-counts taken or to begin treatment. Some had long ago tested positive for HIV. Others had never tested. They either stayed at home, or visited traditional healers, or visited one of the general practitioners in town who is happy to collude with his patient and never mention the word AIDS, while charging a fee for treating symptoms. Their situation was especially tragic, for their condition was hardly a secret. With its newfound diagnostic knowledge of AIDS, the community of Ithanga now recognised AIDS when they saw it. And so several people were wasting away and dying before their neighbours' eyes. Everyone knew it was AIDS, but most were discreet. The dying were afforded their right to denial over the right to life that they themselves had lost sight of.
The third category of the chronically ill did visit the clinics and either went on to treatment or expressed a willingness to do so when the time came. But they attempted to do all of this secretly. Most tried to avoid the clinic nearest to Ithanga for fear of being recognised. They would generally try to enrol at the clinic in Lusikisiki's town centre, or, if they could not avoid the local clinic, they would try to go there unseen.
Conclusion
Two years after the initiation of ART in Ithanga, much had changed. Most villagers now knew and recognised the most common opportunistic infections associated with AIDS; the definition of the syndrome had thus expanded considerably, and the space for denying its prevalence had shrunk. Moreover, the number of people on treatment had grown steadily. By early 2007, as many as two dozen villagers, perhaps more, were on ART. Everybody in the village knew where to go to test and to get on to treatment. These are considerable achievements.
What had not been achieved, though, was the normalisation of AIDS as an ordinary chronic illness. Many people were still dying before the eyes of their families and neighbours because they could not cope with the prospect of acknowledging that they had AIDS. The acute sense of shame associated with it had shifted, been displaced, and found new forms, but it was far from eradicated.
Perhaps the most important factor in shaping the future of the meaning of AIDS in Ithanga is whether the quality of ART can be maintained. In early 2006, Lusikisiki's clinics were putting 110 people on treatment every month, despite the fact that more than half of nursing posts were vacant and unadvertised. Workloads were climbing steadily. Before the ART programme began, a Lusikisiki clinic nurse saw an average of 27 patients a day. At the height of the ART programme, the figure had climbed to 49 (MSF 2006 But at home it often appears that the South African Police Service (SAPS) is at the receiving end of a constant stream of criticism.
How do we account for these disparities? Should we elevate the views of a respected analyst such as Bayley above that of ordinary South Africans, or should public opinion be key to any assessments of the SAPS? And, given such significant differences in opinion on the SAPS, is there a need for a more balanced view?
Origins of the assessment A recent assessment of the SAPS, undertaken by the Centre for the Study of Violence (CSVR), 1 attempts A widespread assumption is that democratic reform is concerned with 'de-politicising' the police. Arguably it is more correct to think of this process in terms of a 're-politicisation' (Gordon 2006:124) of the police, in terms of which the police are obliged to protect the exercise of democratic political rights, such as rights to freedom of assembly, but have to refrain from interfering with politics conducted within the parameters of democratic norms.
2) Governance, accountability and transparency
The standards applied in relation to management of the police organisation in complying with the exercise of authority by components of government or the courts; in relationships with the public or other agencies; and in attending to internal management and supervision.
3) Service delivery for safety, justice and security The nature of the basic services that police provide in a democracy, and how these are delivered.
4) Proper police conduct
The principles of integrity, fairness and respect for human rights and dignity that guide the conduct of democratic police, and how police services support and ensure adherence by police officers to these principles.
5) Police as citizens
The rights of police officers themselves, as part of a democratic society, to non-discriminatory recruitment and promotion practices, to decent conditions of service, to collective bargaining, to fair disciplinary procedures, and to a high level of support in attending to issues of safety.
By applying the framework contained in the The police that we want, the assessment aimed to deepen the scrutiny that the SAPS is subjected to. In so doing it aimed to improve the ability of civil society and government to hold police in South Africa accountable. Considering the size of the SAPS, the level of research that formed the basis for this assessment was limited, and the assessment cannot claim to be a meticulously scientific assessment of the SAPS. Compensating for the modest level of research involved, however, was a depth of insight related to the fact that the report was written by a team of researchers who between them combined over 20 years of experience in the policing field in South Africa.
Notwithstanding the limitations of the research, the final report that emerged from the assessment process may reasonably be regarded as the most rigorous and thorough overall analysis of the state of the SAPS and of policing in South Africa produced thus far, and the framework of recommendations provided can be seen as an important contribution to the debate about the future of police reform in South Africa.
Findings
This article highlights some of the findings of the report, focusing on particular areas of interest.
Overall there is reason to be very positive in relation to the progress made in the first area, that of 'Policing democratic political life'. This is most notable in relation to the turnaround achieved in public order policing since the early 1990s, the contribution of the SAPS to the policing of elections, the priority attention of the SAPS to political violence in KwaZulu-Natal, and the effectiveness of the SAPS in tackling the threat of armed insurrection posed by the right-wing Boeremag. However, the positive change was tempered by some instances of heavy-handed policing of demonstrations, allegations of continuing partisanship among elements of the police in KwaZulu-Natal, and abuses committed against members of 'social movements' involved in political activities opposed to the government.
With regard to the other four areas, the overall assessment was more mixed. In relation to 'Governance, accountability and transparency' the SAPS has a consistently good record in complying with the accountability requirements imposed by government, and in subjecting itself to the authority of the courts. But the reluctance of the SAPS to make crime statistics available, other than by means of the annual report, undermined the SAPS's own strategy of devolving responsibility to the local level and of strengthening local level partnerships with communities. Participants in partnership structures need access to crime statistics in order to interpret the local crime situation.
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In addition, the handling of the crime statistics issue has contributed to a climate of anxiety in the SAPS regarding the provision of information. This is counterproductive to such a large organisation; and one that needs to place a premium on effective communication. There are also serious questions about internal systems of management and control, the impression being that supervisory structures function in a haphazard way. There have been extensive efforts to improve cooperation with municipal police agencies, but there have been ongoing unresolved tensions with the Directorate of Special Operations (Scorpions), and relationships with private security companies are ad hoc.
Rather than service delivery being primarily good or bad, the principal problem appears to be one of unevenness. This is reflected in key dimensions of police service delivery, such as the response to emergency calls and crime investigation, with numerous examples of dedicated high quality police work continually off-set by incompetence or disinterest. The SAPS suffers from a lack of clarity about the role of policing, a problem exacerbated by confusion about the meaning of the term 'crime prevention'. It may be helpful to define the principal role of the police as one of 'police crime prevention', which would generally involve crime prevention activities that have a law enforcement component.
Another issue that calls for attention is the need for the SAPS to sophisticate its use of crime reduction strategies that are targeted at specific types of crime, possibly based on research that reveals which police stations are having the best results in tackling crime. On the positive side, the SAPS appears to have taken seriously the challenge of extending services to all sectors of the South African population, so that access to police services has improved overall. However, this is unfortunately not reflected in a consistent quality of services provided, reflecting the problem of unevenness mentioned above.
Of the five areas that form the focus of this assessment, the area of 'Proper police conduct' perhaps reveals the greatest shortcomings of the SAPS. The SAPS has a good statement of values, but commitment to these values is not consistently carried through in its organisational practice. There is evidence of a pervasive problem of corruption, and anti-corruption measures are weak. While the SAPS introduced a comprehensive anti-torture policy in 1998, commitment to the policy has not been sustained, and reports of the most serious types of torture continue. The use of force is addressed through training, but there is not consistent attention to questions relating to the use of force by police managers.
One of the issues addressed in the 'Police as citizens' area is the focus on employment equity and the strong emphasis placed by the SAPS on issues of representivity. While employment equity and affirmative action policies are necessary, it appears that the SAPS has been somewhat overzealous in adhering to them. Particularly where implementation of these policies is combined with other factors, such as nepotism or favouritism, it is likely to contribute negatively to staff morale.
The last decade has seen a substantial overall reduction in the number of police killed. While this may partly be credited to efforts by the SAPS to improve police safety, there is no ongoing monitoring of the circumstances in which these deaths take place. 3 As a result, SAPS efforts to address police safety reflect a lack of insight into the key circumstances where police are at risk. Beyond this, however, it is reasonable to be fairly positive about the treatment of SAPS members, with pay and benefits being reasonably good, while SAPS members also enjoy rights to collective bargaining and recognition of their rights in disciplinary procedures.
Recommendations
Even though the assessment drew attention to the continuation of problems such as torture, which may be seen as partly a legacy of the widespread human rights violations under apartheid, there can be little doubt that the SAPS is a profoundly different organisation from its Apartheid-era predecessors, the South African Police (SAP) and homeland police forces.
In fact, it appears that turbulence, related to the level of change that the SAPS has been through, has had a destabilising impact on the organisation. In pursuit of transformation and increased efficiency, the SAPS has, since 1994, gone through a number of restructuring processes. In addition to various processes of restructuring, the recent focus on rapid recruitment and the vigorous implementation of employment equity policies, there have been various other sources of turbulence in the SAPS. These include changes in the skills, knowledge and values required of police officers in their work, related to the emphasis on crime prevention, community policing, and human rights, and changes in the demographics of South Africa, with a major influx of would-be immigrants into South Africa in the post-apartheid period. Not only has the SAPS been compelled to expand its service delivery capacity to meet the needs of all South Africans for policing services, but the demands for service from its primary Apartheid-era constituency (white South Africans) have also become more extensive and more urgent as a result of rising crime. It is therefore not surprising that the process of reform has achieved mixed results.
The latest wave of restructuring, involving the dissolution of the SAPS area level, has been controversial, partly because of its disruptive effect on the Family Violence, Child Abuse and Sexual Offences Units. However, though it may be valid to ask questions about the process by which the restructuring is being implemented, this restructuring may be regarded as a necessary measure, given that the SAPS had too many levels of management, which detracts from its ability to put skilled personnel in operational roles on the ground.
But while the latest round of restructuring should be supported, it is recommended that the SAPS avoids further restructuring in the coming period, and focuses on building stability and consistency in the organisation through in-service training, strengthening the quality of promotions, and improving management and control.
This recommendation is also informed by a concern about the current emphasis on rapid recruitment to expand SAPS numbers, which in 1996 alone involved training roughly 11 000 new personnel. It is likely to be associated with a loss of rigour and quality in both selection and training processes.
Considering that new personnel are coming into an organisation where systems of management and control are already inconsistent, the large number of new recruits is likely to place further strain on these systems. In the absence of attentive management and supervision, new recruits are unlikely to get the support they need. Therefore, despite its potential, the current wave of recruitment may lead to limited gains in the quality of policing. As a result it may frustrate efforts to strengthen the contribution of police to fighting crime. Rapid recruitment, combined with the absence of reliable management systems, may be associated with a heightened risk of abuses and other problems, such as unnecessary use of force linked to a lack of experience. Similar problems are also likely to occur among police reservists, who are also being brought into the SAPS at a rapid rate.
Conclusion
The assessment confirms the view that there has been substantial progress and numerous achievements in the process of police reform, but also draws attention to shortcomings of the SAPS that need to be addressed.
The uneven quality of policing coupled with the disparate views on the state of policing in South Africa (referred to in the introduction to this article), are indeed reflected in South African opinion. For instance, while 45% of respondents to the 2003 National Victims of Crime Survey indicated that they thought the police were doing a bad job, a similar, though slightly greater number (52%) indicated that they thought police were doing a good job (Burton et al 2004:77-78) . 4 One criticism of the assessment may be that it does not adequately engage with the question of an appropriate model for the provision of policing services and is possibly shaped too strongly by assumptions about the type of services conventionally 'expected of powerful Western democracies in a neoliberal era' (Gordon 2006:218) .
South Africa is a country characterised by high levels of inequality. Policing is carried out in circumstances that are widely disparate from each other. More affluent communities are not only able to supplement their reliance on police with the services of private security companies, but bring specific capacities and resources to their participation in structures such as Community Policing Forums. By contrast, poorer communities not only lack these capacities and resources but are frequently also plagued by a more intractable problem of violence, rooted within the day-to-day relationships of many community members. A future assessment should probably give more attention to questions about the adaptability and creativity of the SAPS in responding to these challenges. 
I n September 2006 the Institute for Security
Studies initiated a study of the South African Police Service (SAPS) Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs) in Gauteng. The study started a few weeks into the implementation of the SAPS restructuring process. During the study it emerged that members of these units were angered and frustrated by the apparent lack of support they had received from their unions with regard to the restructuring process. They claimed that they had been 'sold out by the unions' and expressed the view that the 'unions don't care about us'. This exacerbated the already widespread feelings of anger and insecurity caused by the restructuring process.
This article examines the negotiations between unions and police management on the restructuring process. It considers how poor communication between police management and unions, and the confusion created by the changes in terminology used to refer to organisational changes in the SAPS, affected police morale and effectiveness. When the SAPS wishes to undertake any organisational change that will inadvertently affect its members, the process is brought before the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council (SSSBC) and the labour unions. Once the parties are satisfied with the process, the outcome culminates in an agreement.
In 2005 the proposed restructuring process was brought before the SSSBC and unions so that consensus could be reached regarding the process.
The restructuring was initiated by the SAPS Career Management Division. It was intended to address functional problems within the SAPS, including duplicity of functions, weak command and control, and poor service delivery. The restructuring process also sought to eliminate the area level management that had come to be viewed as an unnecessary level of authority. This meant that the SAPS management would now operate on a national, In practice this meant that specialised units would be closed down and their members deployed to stations. The units that were affected were the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS), the Serious and Violent Crimes Unit (SVC), and the Area Crime Combating Units (ACCU).
IN WHOSE

How the process unfolded
Discussions on the restructuring process between the SAPS management and the unions started in mid-2005 at a SSSBC meeting. The SAPS management informed the SSSBC that in terms of the restructuring, areas would be abolished and area commissioners re-deployed to stations. It was decided that a model of accounting stations, with stations clustered around them, would be followed. In April 2006 the SAPS gave the SSSBC an overview of the new organisational structure that had already been approved by the SAPS management. However, the new structure did not address the concerns that the unions had raised. In addition, SAPU disputed the SAPS's claim that extensive consultation had taken place about the new structure, and argued that such consultation was still needed (SSSBC minutes April 2006:19) . SAPU questioned why it was necessary for the entire police service to be restructured, if the intention was to close down only the area offices. the union also expressed concern about the following:
• the reason for the closure of the specialised units • the number of employees that would be affected by the restructuring • the available grievance procedures for members at area bargaining councils
• the lack of agreement on transfer costs for members should they be redeployed • matching and placing of members at stations as per a skills development audit • the resource establishment plan regarding members' choice of where to be placed, and • dispute mechanisms in place for members (SSSBC minutes April 2006:19) .
SAPS management denied that they had not answered all the union's questions on the framework. They also denied the claim that there had not been extensive consultation on the restructuring process, stating that a number of workshops were held to discuss the process (SSSBC minute April 2006:20) .
SAPU was adamant about the point and 'placed on record that in terms of the law there was never a meaningful consultation process on the matter' (SSSBC minutes. April 2006:20) . The SAPS then agreed that a workshop would be held at the end of April 2006 for further discussion. But, according to the SAPU management, the meeting never took place (Omar 28 May 2007) .
A change of language?
In August 2006 the SAPS management did an apparent about-turn on the restructuring. They told unions that they were no longer 'restructuring' because the process would take a long time (14 months), but said that they would continue the 'strengthening of police stations' in the various provinces (SSSBC minutes September 2006:9 In response SAPS management claimed that the restructuring and the strengthening of police stations were two separate processes that should not be confused (SSSBC minutes September 2006:10).
POPCRU remained adamant that their members' interests were of paramount importance in both processes, and that they required clarity on dispute mechanisms and representations. SAPU said they needed clarity regarding the two processes and discussions on the way forward. They further stated that the SAPS needed to respond urgently to their concerns before starting the process of transferring members to strengthen police stations (SSSBC minutes September 2006:10). The proposal, a draft agreement (3/ 2006) on the 'Performance and Reduction of Crime' that involved putting the best people at the right places, was circulated at that meeting. According to the president of SAPU, Divisional Commissioner Nchwe was vociferous that the redeployment referred to in the agreement was not the same as the restructuring (Omar 28 May 2007) , despite there being little difference in terms of the effect the process would have on members of the SAPS.
An agreement
SAPU reiterated that it was necessary to put a mechanism in place for members to raise their concerns about the transfers. In response the SAPS management made a commitment that members would be deployed within reasonable travelling distances, and that the transfer policy would include a dispute mechanism. SAPU also asked SAPS management to clarify issues of radius, relocation and skills, in writing so that they could get a mandate for the agreement. They agreed to sign the document a few days later. POPCRU also signed the agreement 3/ 2006 (Special SSSBC minutes September 2006:22).
The terms of SSSBC Agreement 3 of 2006 are as follows:
• Identified employees will be redeployed to the identified police stations.
• The principles embodied in the transfer policy will be adhered to in the redeployment process.
• Employees will as far as possible be redeployed within reasonable distances from their current workplaces. Only in exceptional cases will redeployment entail a physical relocation of an employee, in which case the employer will implement the policy.
• All employees identified to be redeployed in terms of the needs of the organisation and the skills that they possess will be treated fairly and equitable ( According to the SAPS Efficiency Services Division, 'The focus is on the organisational and functional structures of the provincial offices. The posts will be looked at, and a strategy to place people based on their skills, will be developed and implemented' (Omar 13 August 2007) .
The effect of the agreement
The queries raised by unions at the SSSBC remain unanswered, as do their objections about the lack of proper consultation. This does not bode well for further negotiations between the unions and police management.
SAPU is of the firm opinion that the unions were misled by the signing of SSSBC Agreement 3 of 2006. It is not difficult to follow their reasoning.
Events following the signing of the agreement attest to the fact that Agreement 3 of 2006 was used to further the initial plan of the SAPS management, namely to proceed with the restructuring process. In practical terms all the changes required by the proposed restructuring process have been implemented: the closing down of the area level offices, the closing down of specialised units, and the deployment of members to police stations.
The SAPS Efficiency Services Division however has refuted the fact that the restructuring process, the strengthening of police stations and Agreement 3 of 2006 are part of the same process (Omar 13 August 2007) . 'The restructuring was started, then stopped, because of the Minister's (Nqakula's) report on the impact of violent crime. The focus had to be placed on the strengthening of police stations. The model used to place members was the model that was available; it is the same model that is used to do the restructuring (Omar 13 August 2007) .
The different terminology used by the SAPS to define the process: beefing up of stations, restructuring, strengthening of police stations and reorganisation was confusing to the unions, the council, members and the general public.
The audit report of the Task Team established to assess implementation has now been completed but was not available at the time of printing.
monitoring of the breaches of the agreement, then the unions could withdraw from the agreement legally, and have cause for action against the SAPS management' (Omar 23 August 2007) .
The SAPS management further indicated that phase one of the implementation of strengthening police stations had already been undertaken in Gauteng and rolled out in the other eight provinces, and that members were deployed to workplaces in terms of service arrangements. They explained that they were evaluating the achievements of strengthening the police station process. The establishment of a task team as agreed to between the parties was also imminent; its task was to monitor the implementation of agreement 3 of 2006, and to address any complaints with regards to deployment (SSSBC minutes 2007:8)
A sub-committee meeting of the newly appointed task team regarding Agreement 3 of 2006 was held in April 2007. Unions indicated that they wanted a list from SAPS management of the number of members that were deployed, where they had been placed, and how far the new placements were from their previous positions (SSSBC minutes 2007:1). They said that they had found that members were being transferred to components where their skills were not needed. Also, most employees who received notices were told that they would have to make representations only after they had been transferred.
Unions also stated that the issue of service arrangements was never agreed to in terms of agreement 3/2006 (SSSBC minutes 2007:1). This factor is pertinent in that in police management terminology, a service arrangement is a temporary movement of a member from a currently held position to another position for any period of time. It is defined as a temporary measure and can therefore be rescinded at any time. In terms of Agreement 3 of 2006, members were meant to be 'transferred' to their new positions. The implication of a transfer, according to SAPS policy, is that it can be undertaken by a member him-or herself, or may be conducted by the employer in the interests of the service (Omar May 2007) . If a member is then opposed to the transfer, s/he is allowed to put in a grievance.
SAPU's communication with members
Notwithstanding the above, SAPU has also been remiss in its responsibility towards its members. During interviews with the researcher, members affiliated to the unions were very vocal that the unions had failed to support them during the restructuring and were not available to alleviate their concerns.
SAPU communicates messages to its members via a newsletter, the Union Post, published every two months, and/or via letters. These are sent to the provincial branches and distributed to members. SAPU also has shop stewards or representatives at provincial, area and local level who deal with members directly, regarding issues of concern.
A perusal of the SAPU newsletters demonstrated that union members were informed about the unions' consultations with the police. But it appears that the newsletters were either not reaching the members at their units or stations, or that members are not reading those newsletters.
Issues of the Union Post from April and May 2006
clearly show that SAPU supported the closing down of area offices and the movement of members to stations in the immediate vicinity. It however, does not support a restructuring of the whole SAPS, and emphasises that the process of restructuring must be properly consulted with organised labour (2006:6).
A later edition of the Union Post (2006) informed members about the initial plan to close down area offices without undertaking a substantial restructuring. The article explained that SAPU had agreed to the initial plan to close down the area offices because these structures merely duplicated correspondence from the provincial office to the stations. The article then stated that SAPS management had announced the implementation of a zone model, to which SAPU objected and which resulted in the process being put on hold. Members were informed through the article that the SAPS management then announced a restructuring of the whole SAPS that included the closure of the FCS units, SVC units, CCUs, National Intervention Units, and Crime Intelligence Units. The intention was to deploy these members to stations to boost visible policing, according to a skills analysis that was to be completed at the end of 2006. The article further stated that, while SAPU supported a skills audit, two previous attempts at this had ended disastrously.
In the July 2006 issue of the Union Post (2006) SAPU informed its members that for the previous two months, the SAPS had not been responding to its questions in the SSSBC. Details of the new structure were not forthcoming, the number of units that were to close down was not provided, nor the number of accounting stations to be established. SAPU also stated that they did not support the 'matching and placing' of members, but wanted choices for their members and demanded a dispute process.
The above articles attest to the fact that SAPU did inform members of the restructuring process. That members were not aware of it implies that the message is not reaching members, and that SAPU needs to consider alternative, more effective means of communicating with their members.
Conclusion
The effect of the confused messages has been dramatic. Unions and SAPS management have lost credibility with members, and the relationship between union leadership and police management has been weakened.
The SSSBC agreement 3 of 2006, an agreement purporting to reduce the state of crime in the country, and appealing to unions' sense of sympathy, could be understood as a deliberate attempt by SAPS management to mislead unions into agreeing to the restructuring. The agreement refers to the National Commissioner's constitutional obligation to prevent, combat and investigate crime, and forces an obligation on unions to agree to the conditions. It can, in fact, be interpreted as an inventive method to gain approval of the restructuring process which had been stalled by objections from the unions.
The SAPS intention with the strengthening of police stations was to address concerns regarding the issue of crime. 'Eleven months later, the Performance Chart of the SAPS is showing a drop since the last four years, although violent crime has increased slightly. The impact will however only be visible by July 2008' (Omar 13 August 2007) .
If the process is successful, as envisaged by the SAPS, then the restructuring will be claimed as a victory.
However, the process has taken place at the expense of members and of policing. Issues close to members' hearts, like transfer costs, travel distances and placement, have not been given due consideration and failure to recognise this smacks of disregard for member well-being. The result is members' inattention to duty, which hampers effective policing. 
S
ince 1994, oceans of ink have dried on forests of pulped trees in the quest to understand South Africa's crime problem and develop workable solutions to it. Government departments have produced White Paper after Green, strategies beyond number, commitments to act and press statements by turn self-congratulatory and selfexculpatory; academics and NGO researchers have produced surveys and evaluations on everything from criminality in schools to conditions in South Africa's prisons; journalists and editors have emblazoned our papers and streetlights with stories of horror and pleas for action and accountability.
As a country, we are not short of things to say about crime.
And yet, despite the all-consuming attention crime has enjoyed, the deterioration in the crime situation over the past few years suggests that we may be in one of two positions. The first is that we know far too little about the causes of our crime problem and what we must do to stop it. The second is that we do know the answers to these questions but we can do nothing with that knowledge because either the problems are too intractable or the solutions are beyond our means and ability.
These are not happy alternatives, but of the two, it would be distinctly preferable to have failed to understand our crime problem adequately and/or to have failed to prescribe the correct remedies. This would put us in a far better position than if we understood the problem but found that we could not solve it.
It would require a brave (or dishonest) analyst to assert definitively which of these conditions best describes our situation. Nevertheless, perhaps because the alternative may be too grim to contemplate, it is the view of this writer that, though our social and criminal problems are serious, and that some may actually be intractable, it is our analysis about crime that has been deficient and that changes to policy and strategy could make a significant difference to South African ipcf@iafrica.com crime rates. Most importantly, it is entirely possible to implement these changes. Adopting them, however, would require the serious rethinking of some of the most closely held convictions of many in the crime-and-policing policy community.
Where we went wrong Perhaps the simplest way to demonstrate the way in which South African criminal justice policy has erred, is to reflect that between 1994 and 2007, the number of convicts in South Africa's prisons rose by 26%, from 90 000 to 113 000. Over the same period, however, the number of convicts in Britain's prisons rose by nearly 85%, from 35 800 to 66 000. In the United States, the rate of increase has been about 55%, from 1.5 million to about 2.3 million. In the previous decade-and-a-half, however, the number of convicts serving time in the US had tripled.
Naturally, the fact that one or other country doubles the number of prisoners over a certain period does not mean that that is the most appropriate example to follow. However, given that levels of violent crime in South Africa are much higher than Britain's, it is striking that the number of British convicts has grown three-and-ahalf times faster over the past decade than their South African counterparts.
There are many reasons why South Africa has not locked away as many violent criminals as we might have. The criminal justice system inherited from apartheid lacked legitimacy and, therefore, struggled to obtain the kind of co-operation from victims and witnesses that is needed to prosecute cases successfully in court. We also inherited a justice system unduly wedded to the use of reverse-onus provisions and confessions to secure convictions. When the legal principles on which these were built were deemed unconstitutional in the mid-1990s, the transition to a system that bases its cases on a different logic proved more difficult than anticipated. The criminal justice system, like other institutions in our society, has also had to endure wrenching organisational change -the amalgamation of 11 police agencies, for instance -combined with a fraught process of transformation.
Jointly and separately, these factors would have made the rapid improvement of conviction rates difficult to achieve, but their impact was worsened by a crucial intellectual and conceptual misstep made by all the most important policy-makers, academics and NGOs in the mid-1990s -one that has been repeated ever since. This was the commitment we all displayed to seeing the role of the criminal justice system, first and foremost, as being about preventing crime, with the idea of 'crime prevention' understood in a very direct and literal way. This article will put forward three main reasons why the criminal justice policy-making community has been in thrall of the idea of crime prevention. The first of these is what might be called the politics or, even, the aesthetics of crime prevention.
As a culture, much of our common sense dictates that we think of prevention more favourably than its alternative. Prevention, we are taught, is better than cure. A stitch in time, so it is said, saves nine.
There is nothing wrong with these sentiments, and it would be wrong to say that our criminal justice policies have been built on the insubstantial foundations that these bits of folk wisdom reflect. Still, there is something of this sentiment in the background of many discussions about crime and justice. This is also, however, a sentiment that has been immeasurably strengthened by the basic tenor of South Africa's politics across all political parties. This holds -correctly and indisputably -that we have a history in which immense damage was done to individuals, families and communities, and locates the causes of our crime problem in the socio-economic and institutional debris bequeathed us by Apartheid. If we are to get on top of crime, therefore, we must deal with the myriad of social problems that cause it; to do otherwise would be to add insult to socio-economic injury.
If the basic politics underpinning South Africa's understanding of itself is one reason we embraced the idea of crime prevention, another related reason is that, for obvious reasons, policing and law enforcement did not have much legitimacy in the immediate aftermath of Apartheid. These institutions, after all, had been purpose built for protecting the Apartheid regime, and they had used all their legal -and some not-so-legal -powers to that end. Little wonder, then, that one of the abiding responses to many in the policy-making community was that South Africa had seen its fill of hard policing, and that something more palatable was in order.
In relation to policing, then, our most basic sentiments in the mid-1990s were that finding an alternative to aggressive arrest-and-imprisonment policing was a national priority. A second, more important reason why our criminal justice system embraced the idea of crime prevention, however, was that this is precisely what the leadership of the SAPS wanted.
For policing, one of the most profound institutional consequences of the death of Apartheid was that the security branch of the South African Police, long the most powerful branch of the police, went the same way as constitutional disenfranchisement and statutory racism. As this institution was dismantled, people who came out of the uniformed branches quickly filled the vacuum created at the top of the police organisation. The uniformed branch, as opposed to the detective services, understands policing as being primarily directed at the prevention of crime. It is, in the language of the SAPS, the seat of 'proactive' as opposed to 'reactive' policing.
It is no coincidence, of course, that a government whose instincts tended towards crime prevention would select a leadership core for the new SAPS from the ranks of that part of policing with most affinity for the programme. What is important, however, is that a shared commitment developed between government policy-makers and police leadership to devoting the resources of the SAPS to preventing crime, and it is this that set us on our present path.
These two reasons -the instincts and politics of government and the organisational dynamics of changing police leadership -were only part of the story, however. By far the most important reason why both government and senior police officers embraced a vision of policing which was focused on preventing crime, was that everyone who was reading the international literature at the time would have believed that this approach was the last, best hope for policing.
How we were misled by international experience Anyone who was paying attention to the criminology journals and police science books written in the early-and mid-1990s would have been forgiven for thinking that the traditional model of policing was being written off as a failure. Dubbed, somewhat sneeringly, the 'professional model of policing', it was seen as having failed the societies in which it was most strongly entrenched. That failure was measured by the extraordinary rise in crime that countries in the developed worldmost importantly, the United States -had experienced in the 1980s and early 1990s, and had led to the demand for new thinking about policing. In essence, this came in two varieties: on the one side, conservative thinkers punted what came to be called variously 'zero-tolerance policing' or 'broken windows policing'; on the other, liberal and leftleaning theorists and policy-makers staked their names to some version of 'community policing' or 'problem-solving policing' or some other variation on the theme.
To be sure, there is much that separates zerotolerance policing and community policing, with the former imagining steely-faced centurions policing a city's streets for even the most minor infraction, and the latter focusing on what might be called the tactics of 'armed social work' -community engagement, partnership building, and the like. Different as these two approaches are, however, they also share an important commonality: a conviction that policing, done in the right way, can reduce crime directly. For both schools, crime prevention is the chief aim and object of the police. As importantly, for both, that goal is achievable.
These, then, are the reasons why we have adopted the prevention of crime as the lodestar of criminal justice in South Africa: our politics, the views of police leadership, and the conviction, prevalent among criminologists at the crucial times during the development of our new policies, that crime prevention, understood as being different from, and, in some ways, opposed to, law enforcement, was the way of the future.
The fact is that, whether policing for crime prevention had any prospect of success elsewhere in the world, the UK and US governments were not so convinced of the likely success of the new approaches that they stopped building prisons. In South Africa, by contrast, we have allowed our criminal justice system -the institutions involved in investigating, prosecuting, adjudicating and incarcerating offenders -to stagnate and even to degrade. This has been a fundamental, if still rectifiable, mistake.
How failing to build the criminal justice system has stimulated criminality It is one thing to argue that we have adopted a poorly conceived macro-strategy and another to claim that any plausible alternative would have done any better. It may be, after all, that the problem is not our ability to understand the causes of crime or to implement appropriate solutions, but that our social problems are thoroughly intractable. If that is the case, then no criminal justice strategy could fundamentally affect the levels of crime in South Africa.
If it were literally true that the peculiar social, cultural, economic and historical forces operating in South African society were the cause of our high crime rate, this would certainly be a possibility. It may be, however, that this is not the case, and that the decision to focus criminal justice attention on the prevention of crime rather than on the arrest, prosecution and incarceration of offenders has itself helped to shape the way the crime wave has developed in post-liberation South Africa. In this regard, it is worth asking if the failure to incarcerate sufficiently large numbers of people involved in violent crime is itself a factor in explaining the prevalence of violent crime in South Africa -and the view taken by this researcher is that it must have done.
In this regard, consider the findings of a recently published study into the way obesity spreads through a population. Tracking the movements of ALTBEKER over 12 000 people over 32 years, the authors found that there were very strong, statistically highly significant correlations between one person's gaining weight and weight gains for their friends and relatives. They found that:
[A] person's chances of becoming obese increased by 57% if he or she had a friend who became obese; … [that a]mong pairs of adult siblings, if one sibling became obese, the chance that the other would become obese increased by 40%; … [that i]f one spouse became obese, the likelihood that the other spouse would become obese increased by 37%; … [and that p]ersons of the same sex had relatively greater influence on each other than those of the opposite sex. (Christakis and Fowler 2007: 370) Trying to explain this, the authors posit a mechanism that could tell us something important about how criminality might have spread through our population:
To the extent that obesity is a product of voluntary choices or behaviours, the fact that people are embedded in social networks and are influenced by the evident appearance and behaviours of those around them, suggests that weight gain in one person might influence weight gain in others. Having obese social contacts might change a person's tolerance for being obese or might influence his or her adoption of specific behaviours (e.g., smoking, eating, and exercising). (Christakis and Fowler 2007: 371) If we change the language of this quote to make it refer to the question of crime and criminality in South Africa, we might arguably learn something about how the failure to arrest and incarcerate sufficiently large numbers of people engaged in acts of violent crime might have had the effect of encouraging the criminality of others. It may be, in other words, that while our socio-economic conditions have been pushing people into crime, the sheer prevalence of this kind of behaviour, and the sheer number of people involved, has had the equally damaging effect of pulling many other people into it, too. If that is so, the focus on crime prevention, because it has failed and because it has distracted us from the challenge of building a criminal justice system that can identify (swiftly), try (fairly) and incarcerate (humanely) much larger numbers of people who commit violent crimes, is an important reason why crime rates in South Africa are so high.
Drawing attention away from the difficult and, potentially, morally fraught business of catching and incarcerating violent offenders has been manifest in a number of ways. By far the most prominent of these has been the failure to build sufficient prison accommodation -which has grown at a pace no faster than the growth rate of the South African population as a whole -and the failure to invest adequately in the building of the Detective Service, prosecution service and magistracy. Indeed, in the case of the Detective Service, some organisational policies adopted in the police since the mid-1990s may have been purpose-built to undermine the status and morale of detectives, making it far harder to recruit and retain talented personnel. Together with the failure to address weaknesses in the courts and the lack of prison accommodation, this means that our conviction rates are simply too low, and the flow of convicts into our prisons is too slow.
By most standards, of course, South Africa is a society with a very large prisoner population. Certainly, this is so in per capita terms, where our imprisonment numbers are among the highest on the planet. This, many have suggested, implies that the increased use of prison is not the answer we need. Perhaps this is true. Perhaps sending large numbers of people to prison will not make all that much difference to crime rates, or will do so only very slowly. These are real possibilities. By the same token, however, the fact is that, measured in relation to our murder rates, South Africa's prisoner population is not large at all. In fact, one compilation of the relevant statistics -always bearing in mind the enormous difficulties of making cross-country comparisons -implies that our prisoner-per-murder figure is among the lowest in the world. If that is true, then we may not have used prison anywhere near as gratuitously as some have suggested, and may not have generated a prisoner population large enough to begin to roll back the crime wave.
Conclusion
The upshot of all this is that South Africa needs to rethink some of its basic concepts of criminal justice. It may be true that our history and our social conditions are uniquely poised to produce crime, but if criminal behaviour is in some sense contagious -that it is 'caught' by non-criminals from contact with criminals in the same way that obesity seems to spread through a population -then we need to look as closely at our ability to quarantine the infected. By all means we should continue to work on addressing the root causes of crime, but we should resist the hubristic notion that we will crack these problems quickly or easily. If we have learnt anything from the past 13 years, it should be this.
If we are to address crime seriously, we need a serious programme that will build a criminal justice system that can double the number of convicts behind bars over the next ten years, focusing particularly on violent offenders, while at the same time maintaining a commitment to the due process rights of the Constitution and our criminal law. This will not be easy, not least because building a decent and effective justice system may be the work of generations. Having said that, there are two reasons for optimism. The first is that it seems that, however moderate the success of the SAPS at solving the vast majority of crimes committed, when a high-profile outrage occurs, it is often (if not usually) able to secure arrests. This suggests that the basic infrastructure of technical skills and competencies on which an efficient and effective Detective Service could be built, exists.
The second reason for optimism is that the SAPS, as opposed to most police services in the developing world, has a degree of professionalism which might be another crucial ingredient in any attempt to build such a service. All is not as it should be, to be sure, but, when compared to the corruption and incompetence of many a developing world police force, the SAPS stands out as exceptional. This, too, makes it possible to imagine successfully building the capacity to take sufficient numbers of violent criminals off the streets and in so doing to begin to roll back the crime wave.
